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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

the Aspinall Unit ("Unit") for mining purposes. The water court held
that since the Bureau of Reclamation ("BUREC") held the water rights
to the Unit, Mount Emmons needed a contract with BUREC to benefit
from the subordination policy. The policy essentially stated that inbasin projects on the Gunnison and its tributaries above the Unit
could deplete at least 60,000 acre-feet of water. The Colorado
Supreme Court rejected this decision.
The Court previously held that based on the subordination
agreement, BUREC must allow upstream,junior, in-basin depletions of
at least 60,000 acre-feet water. The Court stated that this depletion
allowance trumped BUREC's senior rights to appropriate water.
Because Mount Emmons was an in-basin and upstream appropriator,
the Court determined that Mount Emmons was an intended
beneficiary of this depletion allowance.
Furthermore, the Court disapproved of the water court's reliance
on Board of County Comm'rs v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n to
determine the case. In Crystal Creek, the water court determined that
potential appropriators needed a contract with BUREC for access to
the 60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance. Based on the facts in Crystal
Creek, the water court similarly decided that Mount Emmons also
needed a contract with BUREC to access the depletion allowance. The
Supreme Court disagreed with this analysis because in Crystal Creek, the
appropriator was a trans-basin diverter, unlike Mount Emmons, which
was an in basin appropriator.
Finally, the Court determined that Mount Emmons was an
intended beneficiary of the subordination agreement, and that Mount
Emmons and BUREC did not need a contract for the issuance of a
conditional water decree. According to the Court, Mount Emmons
must show that water was available as a prerequisite to receiving a
conditional water right. Therefore, the Court reversed the water
court's denial and remanded the case to determine if a sufficient
amount of water was available to satisfy Mount Emmons' application
for a conditional water right.
Stefania Niro
Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2001)
(holding that the owner of property burdened by a ditch easement
who cannot secure the consent of the benefited owner to move or alter
the easement may make alterations only after obtaining a court
declaration that such alterations will not damage the benefited
owner).
The Roaring Fork Club ("Club") acquired neighboring,
upgradient property adjoining St. Jude's Company ("Ranch"). The
Club and the Ranch shared an interest in three irrigation ditches that
traversed the Club's property. The Club intended to develop its
property for recreational use by building a private fishing and golf
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club. In order to accommodate its development plans, the Club
attempted to purchase a portion of the Ranch's easements, or to
formalize a ditch maintenance agreement. However, when the parties
were unable to reach an agreement, the Club moved forward with
construction in and around the ditches.
The Ranch initiated a trespass action against the Club, seeking a
mandatory and permanent injunction requiring the Club to restore
the ditches to their original condition. The trial court, acting in equity,
concluded that the Club had committed trespass on the Ranch's
easements. However, because the Ranch sought an equitable remedy,
the trial court concluded that the Ranch was entitled to injunctive
relief in one of two forms. The Club must either restore the ditches to
their original condition or assume all responsibility for and expense of
operation and maintenance of the ditches on its property, and be
permanently obligated to deliver water to the Ranch in the amount,
quality and time consistent with the Ranch's adjudicated rights. The
court gave the right to choose between the alternative remedies to the
Club, which chose the maintenance and delivery option.
The Ranch appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding
that the maintenance and delivery option did not comply with
Colorado law. Further, the court of appeals held the trial court order
unjustifiably rewarded the Club for deliberate and conscious trespass.
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the court of appeals was correct in preempting the trial court's
exercise of equitable discretion, and whether the court of appeals
erred by requiring an award of injunctive relief.
The majority rule in the United States, which prohibits burdened
estate owners from unilaterally relocating easements, has historically
governed ditch easements as well. Nevertheless, competing land uses
and unclear common-law precedent have led to conflicts. Although
the supreme court found that the Club had trespassed upon the
Ranch's easement, they recognized that competing uses should be
accommodated, if possible, and that inflexible notions of dominant
and servient estates did little to advance that accommodation.
The supreme court looked to the Restatement (Third) of Property
(Servitudes) § 4.8(3) (2000) ("Restatement") to articulate a balanced
approach between burdened and benefited estate holders. Thus, the
supreme court found the Restatement allowed a burdened property
owner, such as the Club, to unilaterally move or alter a ditch easement
in order to maximize the use of its own property (unless it is specified
in deed or otherwise to have a certain location), subject both to a
reasonableness test and to the constraints delimited in the
Restatement rule.
The supreme court then explained how it reconciled the notion
that interference with a ditch easement without consent, which
constitutes trespass, with the Restatement doctrine. If a burdened
owner seeks to move or alter a ditch easement and the benefited
owner refuses consent, the burdened owner may seek a declaratory
judgment from a court that the alteration does not damage the
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benefited owner(s) in accordance with the Restatement test. In such a
proceeding, a judge would apply the Restatement rule to determine
whether the planned changes pass the three-prong test.
The three-prong test requires the burdened owner to present a
prima facie case that the alteration would cause no damage under the
Restatement rule. A successful showing would shift the burden to the
benefited owner to establish damage. If the burdened owner made a
showing of no damage and the benefited owner's evidence was
insufficient to rebut, the court would enter a declaration for the
burdened owner. However, if the benefited owner successfully
demonstrated damage, the court should decline to permit the
alteration.
In evaluating damage, or the absence of damage, the trial court
must not only look at the operation of the ditch for the benefited
owner, but also at the maintenance rights associated with the ditch. In
addition, the water provided to the ditch easement owner must be of
the same quantity, quality and timing as provided under the ditch
owner's water rights and easement rights in the ditch.
Returning to the case at hand and recognizing that their opinion
identified a remedy previously not clear in law, the supreme court
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the Club's
alteration of the easement was reasonable and otherwise satisfied the
Restatement criteria. If the alterations did not meet the test, the court
must order restoration. Further, the Ranch was entitled to an order
allowing it to inspect, maintain, operate and repair the ditch easement
and water structure, irrespective of allocation of costs and burdens of
maintenance that might form part of equitable relief.
John A. He fich
CONNECTICUT
Wood v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals., 784 A.2d 354 (Conn. 2001) (holding
spring water collection, storage, and transportation is not a permitted
agricultural use within Somers Town Code 214-4).
Hillside and co-plaintiffs ("Hillside"). appealed the trial court's
decision to uphold a cease and desist order the zoning Board of
Appeals in the Town of Somers ("Board") issued following judgment
that collecting, storing, and transporting spring water for human
consumption is not a permitted agricultural use within A-i zoning
districts, pursuant to Somers Town Code provision 214-4. The court
concluded Hillside failed to prove the Board's statutory interpretation
was illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of its discretion. Hillside also
claimed the court should not have decided whether the use was legally
nonconforming, because the Board failed to address such issue
initially, and, thus, the court should have remanded it to the Board.
Applying Somers zoning regulations, the appellate court's

